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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000587

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TU

SUBJECT: TURKEY: INDICTMENT IN AKP CLOSURE SUIT - THE CASE
FOR THE ROAD TO SHARIA

REF: ANKARA 578 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: PolCouns Janice G Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

^1 . (C) Summary: The 162-page indictment that Court of

Appeals Chief Prosecutor Yalcinkaya submitted to the
Constitutional Court, asking that the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) be closed as a center of anti-secular
activity, is a typical Turkish indictment - high in
accusations, low in concrete evidence. The bar for
indictments in Turkey is relatively low. A prosecutor need
only show that plausible evidence exists on which a case can
be based.

^2. (C) The indictment devotes substantial effort to placing

the case within the framework of European and international
law. It contains a compilation of AKP leaders' statements,
actions, and references to previous political party
memberships — with particular emphasis on anything related
to the headscarf amendments — that the prosecutor alleges
demonstrate AKP ' s aim to erode Turkey's secular structures
and lead the country toward sharia law. He includes vague
language on possible resort to violence, or jihad. In
Yalcinkaya 's analysis, AKP ' s parliamentary majority makes it
an instrument of power that must be reined in. Yalcinkaya
outlines his duty as protector of the secular republic and
emphasizes that secularism - not democracy - is the bedrock
of the Turkish Republic. End summary.

Laying the Groundwork

1L3 . (U) The indictment describes political parties as an
indispensable element of democracy, but explains they are
singled out for special legal treatment because of the effect
they can have on society's basic principles. Yalcinkaya
devotes considerable effort to demonstrating that this case
complies with the standards of European and international
conventions. According to the European Charter of Human
Rights, he states, parties can be closed if they encourage
racism, terrorism, xenophobia, violence or intolerance.

1L4 . (U) Closing a political party constitutes interference
with freedom of organization; the bar must be high, and the
penalty proportionate to the crime. Party closure is a tool
to be used only in the most serious situations. There must
be evidence of a clear and present threat to democracy. In

that context, speeches and acts of the party leader and
members both bind the party and paint a clear picture of the
party ' s aims .

^5. (U) The prosecutor refers to certain European totalitarian
movements, which started as legal political parties and went
on to destroy democratic systems . When national authorities
spot such a trend, they have the obligation to prevent it
before concrete anti-democratic steps can be taken.

^6. (U) The basic legal authorities on which Yalcinkaya pins
the case are Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and the
Political Parties law (PPL). He refers as well to the
Constitution's first four immutable articles, which include
the principle of the secular state. According to the
Consitution and the PPL, preconditions for a party closure
include :

--When a party's bylaws and program violate Article 68, para
4 of the Constitution: "The statutes and programs of
political parties shall not be in conflict with the
indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and
nation, human rights, national sovereignty, and the
principles of the democratic and secular Republic."

--When the party in question becomes a center for activities
in violation of Para 4 of Art 68 of the Constitution.

--When the party in question accepts financial assistance
from foreign states, international institutions and persons
and corporate bodies that are not Turkish citizens.

Options for dealing with the first two include depriving the

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party of state assistance in whole or in part; or closure.
What is Secularism

^7. (U) The prosecutor stresses the need to understand

secularism from the Turkish perspective. A democratic
secular state makes no distinctions among its citizens based
on their beliefs. Pursuant to Constitutional Court
decisions, secularism dominates all basic principles of the
Constitution, including democracy, and forms the bedrock of
Turkey's constitutional order. According to Court decisions,
religion should not be dominant in state affairs; unlimited
freedom should be granted to the spiritual life of
individuals; religions should be placed under constitutional
guarantee; limitations should be introduced to protect the
public order, security and interest and to prevent the
exploitation and/or misuse of religion. Finally, the state
(not the government), in its role as guarantor of public
order and rights, has authority to control issues of
religious rights and freedoms.

What is AKP

J.8 . (SBU) Making direct reference to statements PM Erdogan has
made comparing AKP to European Christian Democratic Parties,
the indictment states, "Political parties that take political
Islam as their basis have nothing in common with Christian
Democratic Parties in Europe". Political Islam in Turkey is
not limited to an individual and his God, but claims to
regulate the state and society. The basic code of political
Islam is sharia. Political Islam and its constitution,
sharia, are not democratic, but totalitarian. To evade the
watchful eye of the institutions of democracy, AKP, the
indictment charges, uses "takiyye" (deceit) — hiding its
true intentions to accomplish its goal. This, method, too,
finds its source in sharia. Any arrangement that emphasizes
religious requirements cannot be democratic; only a secular
state can be democratic. Ataturk alone abolished sharia in a
Muslim society.

AKP ' s Alleged Crimes

^9. (SBU) For a political party to be a center of anti-secular
acts, these acts must be committed "intensively" by party
members, and implicitly or openly adopted by party
decision-making boards or organs. The dates on which alleged
acts were committed are not important. "No matter how long
ago the acts were committed," the indictment may cite them to
show the party as a "center" for anti-secular acts. This
permits Abdullah Gul ' s statements and acts as a founding
member — as PM, FM, deputy PM — to be attributed to the
party .

J.10. (U) As evidence of AKP ' s intent, the prosecutor focuses

on :

--Presumed continuity with (banned) AKP predecessor parties,
based on continuity of party founders and members, including
PM Erdogan, President Gul and many others.

--The presumption that AKP ' s intent is gradually to transform
Turkey into an Islamic state, with "moderate Islamic
republic" as a mid-point and sharia as end-point; numerous
individuals ' statements are used allegedly to prove this
charge (this is where the reference to Colin Powell fits in,
who once termed Turkey a "moderate Islamic republic", as well
as Erdogan ' s co-chairmanship of BMENA, which Yalcinkaya
describes as a "US project aimed at converting involved
countries into moderate Islamic regimes").

--Emphasis on the fact that AKP is not a marginal party, but
rather one that wields power which thus needs to be closely
watched/examined .

1L11. (SBU) The headscarf reforms are cited as evidence of
AKP ' s intentions to turn the state toward sharia:

--The Education Ministry and YOK are tools used to fulfill
AKP ' s vision. Those who want to transform a society knows

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they must start with education. A number of examples are
offered of women who wear headscarves, who challenged bans in
court and were rebuffed by courts in Europe, generally with
the argument that the complainant knew the rules under which
she was playing when she applied to a certain school.

--Statements by officials — the PM, Education Minister
Celik, Higher Education Council (YOK) president Ozcan, AKP
Vice chair Dengir Mir Firat, former PM adviser Cuneyt Zapsu,
and others — are cited as exploiting religion and creating a
chaotic environment at universities.

--The prosecutor juxtaposes AKP claims that the headscarf is
a human rights cause with PM Erdogan ' s statement that it had
become a political symbol; turning a religious element into a
political symbol constitutes exploiting religion. (Erdogan,
in Madrid in January, said, "University-age women wearing
headscarves have been under pressure as they have been
accused of using their headscarves as a 'political symbol.'
Even if it is worn as a political symbol, can you consider
wearing it ... a crime? Can you introduce a ban on symbols?")

--Statements by several AKPers that liberalizing use of the
headscarf at universities was the first step; their goal was
to liberalize wearing the headscarf in the public sector as
well .

What Yalcinkaya Thinks

1[12 . (SBU) Yalcinkaya expounds on his own views. In Turkey,
"it is a social fact that many women could not take advantage
of higher education because of poverty and because they had
to abide by the religious bigotry-led patriarchal order."

The headscarf, he states, was AKP's tool to negate women's
liberation struggle and the secular merits of the Republic.
Liberating the headscarf at universities is a dangerous

process that would spread to the public sector; those who do
not wear it will be forced to cover. AKPers have turned
people against the state and dragged society into
secular/anti-secular polarization. He also cites his press
release of 1/17/2008 in which he warned that liberalizing use
of the headscarf would violate the security and unitary
structure of the state. Amendments to the Constitution and
the YOK law would be in violation of the secularism principle
of the Constitution, enshrined in the first four immutable
articles of the Constitution.

Conclusion

^13. (U) The indictment concludes that:

--AKP aims to bring about a societal model based on religion.

From the PM down, AKPers' persistent actions demonstrated
that AKP has become a center of anti-secular activities, a
valid ground for party closure.

--AKP employed political Islamists in the state.

--AKP exploited religious days and holidays at all levels of
the party.

--AKP attempted to amend the immutable articles of the
Constitution by using its majority in parliament, ignoring
the principles of separation of powers and the supremacy of
law.

--Despite existing court decisions, AKP members and
administrators introduced Constitutional arrangements to
liberalize clothing at institutions of higher learning.
Beliefs or clothing, taken as criteria, translate into
discrimination within the state and lead to divisions.

--AKP thus demonstrated its intention to change the basic
principles of the Republic of Turkey, transform the secular
Republic, divide people into those who are pious and who are
not, re-shape the secular judicial structure and open to
discussion the future of the regime and the Republic.

--If the immutable secularism principle of the Constitution

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has been eroded, the Chief Prosecutor must use his authority
to protect the regime and the principles of the Republic. As
a result, AKP should be closed as a center of anti-secular
activities, based on Articles 68/4 and 69/6 of the
Constitution .

--The Kemalist state was born at the end of a struggle
against an Islamic state headed by a Caliphate.

--If AKP could not achieve the regime it wanted through
democratic means, it might use Jihad - violence - as an
alternative means to achieve its aims.

--AKP's actions would damage the peace and democratic regime
of the country and could only be prevented by a closure
decision .

--He demanded a 5-year political ban on 71 AKPers who,
thought their actions and rhetoric, made the AKP a center of
activities against secularism.

Comment

1[14. (C) This is a typical Turkish "kitchen sink" indictment -

a collection of statements and incidents that Yalcinkaya
maintains had reached critical mass. This "throw everything
in" approach risks overreaching and damaging his case and
credibility. It is, though, an accurate reflection of the
prism through which staunch Kemalists view the world: For

them, AKP's majority works against it, not for it, because it
creates a dangerous center of power that must be controlled.

That is more important than the voice of the people.

Attempts at change are aimed against the state, they fear.
Draft laws and disparate statements constitute intent and
prima facie evidence of a crime. AKP ' s efforts constitute an
attempt to turn back the clock to the Caliphate that existed
before Ataturk's revolution. And the headscarf amendments
crystallized AKP ' s "deceitful game": step by step, they
intend to move toward a "moderate Islamic republic" and
thence to theocracy. Much of this may seem exaggerated - but
to the chief prosecutor and those like-minded, it is very
real. They see it as their sworn duty to protect the state
against threats, and they view AKP as the ultimate threat
from within.

^15. (C) The rapporteur of the Constitutional Court submitted

his report on March 27 on the completeness of the indictment.

Based on that, the Court will decide on March 31 whether to
proceed with the closure case. Some contacts have told us
this indictment is meatier than those that caused predecessor
parties Refah and Fazilet to be closed. If it is to proceed,
that is appropriate, given the place AKP occupies today in
Turkey .

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at

http : //www. intelink . sgov . gov/wiki/ Portal : Turk ey

WILSON